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Abstract 
 
In recent years, the impact of bots used for 
manipulating public opinion has become an 
increasingly prevalent topic in politics. Numerous 
sources have reported about the presence of political 
bots in social media sites such as Twitter. Compared to 
other countries, the influence of bots in Finnish politics 
has received little attention from media and 
researchers. This study aims to investigate the 
influence of bots on Finnish political Twitter, based on 
a dataset consisting of the accounts following major 
Finnish politicians before the Finnish parliamentary 
election of 2019. To identify the bots, we extend the 
existing models with the use of user-level metadata and 
state-of-art classification models. The results support 
our model as a suitable instrument for detecting 
Twitter bots. We found that, albeit there is a huge 
amount of bot accounts following major Finnish 
politicians, it is unlikely resulting from foreign entities’ 
attempts to influence the Finnish parliamentary 
election. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Nowadays, many organizations and individuals 
attempt to influence people by spreading propaganda in 
social media through large networks of bot accounts [1, 
2]. There are multiple examples of bots being used to 
distort political discussions on Twitter. One of the most 
notable cases is the 2016 US presidential election, 
where an organization linked to the Russian 
government has been accused of striving to manipulate 
the elections by spreading fake news or biased content 
via Twitter bot accounts [2, 3]. In this light, a number 
of studies have delved into the detection of bot 
accounts through developing and testing new bot 
detection methods. Based on synthesizing key factors 
for bot detection reported in previous studies, the study 
developed an integrated framework for bot detection. 
Specifically, this study aims to demonstrate how 
bots that are being used to influence politics on Twitter 
can be identified using machine learning approaches. 
To demonstrate the application of the method, we 
identified the bots that existed before the Finnish 
parliamentary election in April 2019 using user-level 
metadata. Noticeably, recent publications have found 
evidence of bots being used to influence opinions in 
countries such as the United States [3], Japan [4], 
Brazil [5] and Russia [6]. Similar studies have not been 
conducted in Finland, albeit there is already evidence 
of at least one large but inactive Finnish Twitter botnet 
according to a researcher at F-Secure [7, 8]. In other 
words, our study seeks to answer the following two 
research questions, including: 
RQ1: What are the important features that can be 
used to identify bots? 
RQ2: Do the bots have an impact on Finnish 
politics? 
To answer the research questions, we first develop 
a model that can predict bots using machine learning 
methods. Once the bots are identified, we assessed the 
impact in terms of visibility and popularity of 
politicians followed by these bots. 
This paper contributes to the growing information 
systems science and political data science literature on 
the use of bots and information systems to influence 
voters. The study also adds to bot detection literature 
by evaluating the feasibility of using a limited set of 
profile metadata features in a supervised machine 
learning bot detection model. As a part of the research 
project to detect bot’s effect on ongoing European 
elections, we deem the study addresses a timely and 
important topic, as there is evidence of attempts to use 
bots to influence voters during recent European 
elections [9, 10].  
 
2. Related research 
 
We analyze the related research in three parts. The 
first part looks at how previous research has classified 
bots and provides a clear definition of key terms and 
concepts. The second part analyzes methods that have 
been used to detect bots in Twitter-related research and 
provides a background and benchmarks for the bot 
detection model proposed. The third and last part 
covers literature on the use of bots in political 
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influencing during recent years to support the findings 
and assumptions made. 
 
2.1. Terminology and the definition of a bot 
 
A bot can be defined as an account that is operated 
fully or partially by a program. Thus, at least some 
parts of a bot account’s activities are automated. 
Examples of these include bots belonging to like farms 
that are used on social media to increase the number of 
followers of an account or likes of a particular post. 
However, they are prone to detection and thus, 
deletion. More advanced bots adjust their content 
dynamically based on the behavior of other accounts, 
making them more difficult to detect even if the bot is 
still operated solely by a program. The most 
sophisticated bots are such that humans control parts of 
their activities, such as content creation, which blurs 
the line between the bot and a human user. When 
properly operated, these hybrid bots are almost 
invisible to automatic detection mechanisms, according 
to Grimme et al. [11]. Some bot accounts are inactive, 
also known as sleeper bots [12]. The accounts are 
‘quiet’ most of the time before being activated e.g. to 
spread spam. 
On Twitter, bots can be divided into benign and 
malicious bots [13]. The benign bots adhere to 
Twitter’s rules and guidelines and are clearly 
distinguishable from human accounts usually by name 
or description. Conversely, malicious bots participate 
in activities that are not permitted by Twitter and rarely 
disclose the fact that they are operated by a program. 
Typical use cases include artificially boosting the 
number of followers, likes or retweets and directing or 
blurring discussions as well as spreading spam or 
content that supports a certain cause. Both types 
include bots ranging from simple content sharing 
accounts to human-like social bots that participate in 
discussions and create original content. The phrase of 
social bot here refers to a bot that is meant to mimic 
human behavior [12] by communicating and 
interacting with human users [14]. 
An important subtype of Twitter bots is political 
bots, which are specifically designed to participate in 
political discourse or to promote a certain ideology, 
organization, or individual [12]. In most cases, a 
political bot will have no references to it being a bot 
but may attempt to mimic human behavior in order to 
avoid detection and to influence other users.  
 
2.2. Detecting bots on Twitter 
 
2.2.1. Simple versus complex models. As algorithms 
that control bots become more advanced, so do the bot 
detection algorithms. In literature, bot detection models 
range from the very simple ones that are based on 
analyzing one piece of metadata to those that use 
ensemble methods to analyze large feature sets 
including a mix of metadata, tweeting behavior, and 
content data.  
Past studies on bot detection have been to some 
extent restricted to bots with a specific feature. For 
instance, Beskow and Carley [15] managed to identify 
specific automatically generated bot accounts based on 
a single piece of metadata, the profile name, with 
approximately 95%-99% accuracy depending on the 
algorithm used. However, this type of approach results 
in a very narrow use and the aforementioned model 
could only detect bot accounts that have an account 
name consisting of a randomly generated string of 15 
characters and more than likely to miss out the bots 
with different characteristics. However, as Beskow and 
Carley [15] propose, a tool-box approach where 
multiple different models are combined can make even 
the simple models an important contribution to more 
advanced bot detection models.  
A number of bot detection models looked into 
various characteristics of accounts by combining 
metadata and behavior features to identify bots (e.g. 
[16, 17]). One notable issue hinders the reusability of 
these models. Many of these models rely on some form 
of natural language processing, sentiment analysis 
techniques [14] or a specific list of keywords [6, 16, 
18]. This restricts their applicability to a particular 
language and region as well as an event such as an 
election, due to certain themes and hashtags being 
important only in that specific context. Bots have been 
evolving rapidly during the past few years to a point 
that they may be difficult even for a human to 
distinguish them from real users [19]. There is a need 
to update bot detection algorithms, since a workable 
algorithm today may prove to be ineffective after a 
couple of years.  
 
2.2.2. Feature space selection. Machine learning 
methods represents the key approach used in early bot 
detection literature, in which an essential aspect of 
work is to determine the optimal feature space that 
boost bot prediction performances. There are two main 
considerations in the selection of bot detection 
features. Firstly, the features should be added only if 
they improve the accuracy of bot detection. Secondly, 
the features must not make the data collection phase 
overly time-consuming, since Twitter’s API has strict 
rate limits.  
In previous studies, the most common classes of 
features used in bot detection include metadata-based 
features and tweeting characteristics-based features [6, 
8, 18]. User profile provides a large amount of 
metadata while tweets offer useful information, albeit 
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being limited to a certain number of characters (280). 
Based on these features, the amount of analyses that 
can be performed is vast. Other classes of features, 
such as keywords, are not included in the analysis, 
because these features restricted the applicability of the 
model to a specific event. 
Metadata-based features can be divided into two 
different branches. Intuitively, metadata extracted from 
a profile gives information on the account, while 
metadata from tweets gives a combination of 
information from the profile posting it as well as the 
tweet itself [20].  
Metadata that can be extracted from Twitter include 
basic profile information such as name, description, 
and number of friends. An examination on whether 
different pieces of profile information are blank or at 
default contributes to a collection of binary features, 
such as a variable of whether or not the profile picture 
has been added [6, 16]. The more fields are left at 
default, the more likely the account is a bot [6]. Data 
on the number of users that the profile is following, the 
number of followers and ratios of these are also often 
used in prior bot detection studies [6, 8, 18, 20]. 
Profiles that have none or a few followers, but follow 
many profiles are suspect [8]. Lastly, the contents of 
the textual metadata can be analyzed and used to 
classify bots for instance by inspecting the length or 
frequency of certain keywords in the description or 
name [8, 15, 18].   
Earlier findings suggest that a combination of both 
metadata and content features yields optimal results [3, 
18]. Hundreds of different features can be derived from 
Twitter’s metadata and content data, making it a matter 
of preference on which ones to choose. Examples 
include counting the number of hashtags, URLs, and 
instances of specified keywords in the name or 
description of an account. 
The model proposed in this study utilizes metadata-
based features only and therefore, they are examined 
more thoroughly than content-based and other types of 
features. Further, unlike tweet content-based features, 
metadata-based features are more generalizable across 
different linguistic context. Table 1 illustrates some of 
the features that have been used in previous papers [6, 
17, 18]. Unsurprisingly, the most common features are 
the ones that are directly related to how Twitter 
functions, default profile values, with the number of 
followers, friends, tweets, and retweets being examples 
of these.  
 
Table 1. Summary of key features for bot detection used in prior literature 
In Table 1, the features are grouped into four types. 
Some of the most commonly used features are found in 
the first group as binary features. Based on the 
popularity, it can be assumed that they are appropriate 
for bot accounts detection despite their simplicity. 
Binary features are designed to check whether profile 
customization options, such as the profile image and 
background image, are left at default [6, 17, 18].  
The second group also contains many of the 
prevalent features in bot detection models. These 
features are often numerical variables, many of which 
are related to how popular a Twitter account is and 
how actively it is used. Particularly, the numbers of 
followers, friends, tweets, retweets, and likes were 
often investigated [6, 17, 18]. Another commonly used 
feature is the length of the description text, which 
cannot be obtained directly from Twitter but can be 
calculated easily from the metadata [6, 17, 20]. 
The third group of features is ratios that can be 
obtained from the same metadata. When compared to 
the two previous groups, the ratio features offer more 
variety as they are not based on Twitter’s built-in 
attributes. Followers-to-friends ratio is a common ratio 
feature used in many previous studies [6, 18, 20]. In 
the model created by Fernquist et al. [18], the top 
features for bot detection include multiple of ratios, 
with examples being given likes per friend, followers-
friends ratio, and number of likes per followers. 
The last group consists of the features deriving 
from the contents of different attributes. Features in 
this group are occasionally used in earlier studies. Two 
of the features in this list simply check whether an 
Binary features Profile information features Ratio features 
Metadata content 
features 
Defaults: 
- Profile image 
- Background image 
- No user description 
 
Other: 
- Profile verified 
- Location specified 
- No friends 
- No tweets 
General: 
- Number of followers 
- Number of friends 
- Number of tweets 
- Number of likes 
- Age of account 
- Account language 
 
Length: 
- Profile name 
- Profile description 
Activity:  
- Ratio of following and 
followers (FE/FI) 
- Reputation (FE/(FI + FE)) 
- Given likes per friend 
- Given likes per follower 
 
Account age: 
-Friends/Account age 
- Following rate (FI/AU) 
Bot check:  
- Name contains bot 
- Description contains bot 
 
Other content: 
- Number of # in description 
- Keywords in description 
- URL(s) in description 
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account is a bot according to the profile description or 
name by looking if the fields contain the word “bot” 
[15]. The rest of the features relate to an examination 
of URLs, hashtags ,or other keywords [20]. 
Because ratio features were among the best 
performing features widely used in early studies [6, 18, 
20], we include several of them in the study alike. 
 
2.2.3. Classification methods. Because Twitter, like 
most of the social media sites, actively attempts to 
detect and disable bot accounts, the creators of bots 
have responded by making bots behave more like 
humans. Consequently, the selection of features as well 
as preparing the training data has become more 
demanding and for a model to stay up to date, feature 
engineering and adding new training datasets is needed 
[20]. 
Both supervised [6, 15] and unsupervised [16, 21] 
machine learning models have been used in bot 
detection research. The drawback of supervised 
learning is that creating a labeled dataset for training 
the model either requires a large amount of manual 
labeling [6] or using a pre-labeled dataset, which may 
limit the applicability of the model as the datasets most 
likely represent only a fraction of the possible behavior 
of bot accounts in Twitter. Unsupervised learning 
models can detect novel bot behavior that may get past 
a supervised model [16], as the supervised models can 
only detect bots that are similar enough to the dataset 
that was used to train it. However, the results of 
unsupervised models are more difficult to validate due 
to the absence of labeled data. 
Past studies indicated that supervised models are 
better suited for analyzing topical datasets that are 
collected from Twitter’s streaming API [6]. Twitter’s 
API allows performing searches and collecting the data 
on tweets that contain for certain keywords or 
hashtags, which is particularly useful when analyzing 
political discourse that is related to a specific topic, 
such as an election [18, 22]. Since campaigns, political 
parties, candidates and users use hashtags to make their 
tweets visible when commenting on specific topics, it 
is more efficient to mine data on a topical level with 
the keyword search instead of first collecting a large 
dataset of Twitter accounts and then analyzing the 
content of their tweets.  
 
2.3. Use of bots in political influencing 
 
Previous studies illustrated that Twitter-based 
computational propaganda has been used by 
organizations and governments across the world [12]. 
There are several hypothesized goals of the creators of 
bots. These range from increasing the partisanship of a 
population or advancing a cause that the creator of the 
bots supports. [23] noted that “it is an effective non-
military means for achieving political and strategic 
goals.” Measuring the successfulness of political bots 
is difficult as it is hard to quantify the impact that they 
have had for example, on voting behavior [23]. 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of computational 
propaganda campaigns would suggest that they are 
viewed as a functional tool that does have an effect on 
the target audience [23].  
More measurable and easily achievable targets 
include manipulating the popularity and visibility of 
tweets by liking, following, and retweeting content 
with a botnet. These methods can cause a particular 
hashtag to trend thus, pushing it higher into the feeds 
of other Twitter users. Other goals may be to make an 
opinion seem more popular than it actually is or to 
bury actual discussions or factual information by 
making it difficult to follow. Concrete examples 
include spamming pro-government tweets or flooding 
search results related to protests with meaningless 
content making it more difficult for human users to 
find and participate in discussions [24].  
Two earlier studies monitored bot activity in 
Germany during a state parliament as well as Federal 
presidential election [10] and federal election during 
2017 [9]. Bots represented around 7 - 11% of the 
accounts and bot-driven content represented 7.4 - 9% 
of all traffic during the German elections [9, 18]. These 
are modest numbers and in line with Twitter’s estimate 
of bots accounting for approximately 10% of Twitter 
activities. The main reason for concern is that the bot 
activity was skewed towards supporting the alt-right 
movement and was possibly produced by accounts 
outside of Germany [9]. As an extreme example, in 
Russia, Stukal et al, [6] reported that up to 85% of the 
daily tweets containing political keywords were posted 
by bot accounts during 2014-2015. Obviously, there 
are regional differences in the prevalence of bot 
accounts [12]. 
 Finland, the focus of this research, may also be 
affected by bot account, considering i) the current 
growth of Euroscepticism, ii) rise of right-wing 
political movements alongside Finland’s historical 
relations and iii) proximity to Russia that may provide 
a more fertile foundation for bot activity than for 
example Sweden.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study employed an unorthodox approach to 
collect Twitter data as the dataset is compiled from 
individual accounts’ followers, which differs from the 
more traditional methods by collecting all tweets (and 
associated account metadata) that use specific hashtags 
or keywords are gathered through Twitter’s Streaming 
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API. This method is appropriate since the proposed bot 
detection model only requires metadata. The benefits 
of this approach include that it allows detecting both 
dormant bots as well as those that do not use specific 
hashtags or words that the streaming method queries 
for.  
The primary tools used in data collection and 
formatting phase were the statistical programming 
language R and its “rtweet” package, which is an “R 
client for accessing Twitter’s REST and stream APIs”.  
The study analyzed the Twitter accounts of several 
politicians and their followers on Twitter. The profiles 
were selected based on several heuristically chosen 
criteria to ensure that as many political parties as 
possible were represented and that a sufficient amount 
of data was collected. At least a member of parliament 
was taken from each of the current coalition parties as 
well as from all parties that have support of over 5%, 
albeit a maximum of two per party. Furthermore, only 
accounts with over five thousand followers were 
picked. Lastly, some prominent politicians with over 
10 thousand followers were selected even if they do 
not match the other criteria as several influential 
political figures would otherwise be excluded. Table 2 
shows the selected politicians. 
 
Table 2. Summary of selected politicians 
Name Political party Username Followers (K)* 
Alexander Stubb National Coalition Party @alexstubb 370 
Sauli Niinistö National Coalition Party @niinisto 159 
Juha Sipilä Centre Party @juhasipila 126 
Anne Berner Centre Party @AnneBerner 21.7 
Pekka Haavisto Green League @Haavisto 130 
Ville Niinistö Green League @VilleNiinisto 84.3 
Paavo Arhinmäki Left Alliance @paavoarhinmaki 109 
Li Andersson Left Alliance @liandersson 76.5 
Antti Rinne Social Democratic Party @AnttiRinnepj 25.6 
Sanna Marin Social Democratic Party @MarinSanna 14.3 
Jussi Halla-aho Finns Party @Halla_aho 14.5 
Laura Huhtasaari Finns Party @LauraHuhtasaari 13.7 
Sampo Terho Blue Reform @SampoTerho 7.6 
Paavo Väyrynen Seven Star Movement @kokokansanpaavo 10 
*Number of followers at March 2019 
 
The sample consists of 14 politicians from 8 
different parties ranging from liberal to conservative 
and left-wing to right-wing, including the current 
president and three ministers as well as 6 party 
leaders. Many small parties were left out by this 
approach, of which respective politicians did not 
have accounts or had much fewer followers. As a 
result, over 1.1 million Twitter accounts were 
collected as followers of these politicians, but the 
number was reduced to approximately 550,000 after 
filtering out duplicate accounts. The duplicates were 
a result of the fact that many Twitter users were 
following multiple selected politicians.  
The binary features were calculated from 
corresponding attributes where a setting left at default 
or blank equals 1 and a nondefault 0. The ratio 
features were created similarly by calculating the 
values from the profile information metadata and 
then placed into new columns. Ratio calculations that 
resulted in NaN (not a number) or Inf (infinite), were 
replaced with a zero.  
 
3.1. Creating training data 
 
Based on the findings of previous research and 
datasets available for training the model, a selection 
of 11 features was picked for testing the first version 
of the model. The feature space consists of four 
binary features, four profile information features, and 
three ratio features. 
Initially, the model was trained with the cresci-
2017 dataset [25], which contains over 13,000 
labeled accounts divided into groups of social 
spambots, traditional spambots, fake followers, and 
genuine accounts. The training dataset was balanced 
to include 3,000 randomly sampled bot accounts and 
3,000 randomly sampled genuine accounts from the 
cresci-2017 dataset.  
To find a suitable algorithm for the prediction, the 
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Classification 
and Regression Tree (CART), K-nearest neighbors 
(KNN), Support-vector machine (SVM) and Random 
Forest algorithms were tested. Out of these Random 
Forest performed the best, although there were signs 
of either the training data not representing the variety 
of real data or that the model being overfitted as the 
accuracy was over 97% or 98% on most runs. This 
issue was ignored, as the model was deemed 
sufficiently accurate for the first phase where the goal 
was mainly to speed up the training data creation by 
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manually validating list of potential bot accounts 
from the prediction results. The model was then 
tested on a sample of 5,000 accounts from the dataset 
that was collected for this study.  
After manually inspecting on Twitter the accounts 
that the model labeled as bots, it was evident that the 
model had difficulties distinguishing bots and 
genuine accounts. Particularly, accounts that were 
apparently created by people trying out Twitter 
without becoming active users were prone to be 
labeled as bots due to the similarity in the account 
behavior. In most cases, the easily distinguishable 
bots were following approximately 20-100 accounts, 
had 0-2 followers and little to no tweets, retweets or 
likes. 
Based on the performance of the first version of 
the model, it was apparent that the cresci-2017 
dataset was unsuitable for training a model that could 
accurately distinguish bots from humans based on 
metadata. One possible explanation for such 
performance is the fact that the training data used in 
the model had only very clear examples of bots and 
genuine accounts, where the behavior in terms of 
tweets, retweets, likes and ratios of followers and 
following differed widely depending on whether the 
account was a bot or not. However, this does not 
reflect the actual behavior of accounts where in some 
cases even with quantitative and qualitative 
assessment it is difficult to label an account 
accurately as either a bot or a human.  
By manually labeling a set of accounts from the 
dataset consisting of followers of the Finnish 
politicians, a new training dataset that represents the 
actual distribution and behavior of the accounts of the 
target dataset was created. The training data was 
created by checking and verifying the accuracy of 
2,000 accounts predicted to be bots by the first 
model. The results were that out of these accounts 
1,336 were accurately labeled as bots, as they were 
either bots or accounts exhibiting extremely bot-like 
behavior while 664 were actually humans or accounts 
that were impossible to determine as belonging to 
either group.  
A qualitative approach was employed for 
classifying the accounts as either bots or humans. The 
classification started by inspecting the profile 
information of the account. Common signs of a bot 
were the name or description of the account, which 
often included Russian or Arabic and or a seemingly 
random string of characters and numbers coupled 
with the account following 21 other Twitter users, 
which is the default number of recommended users to 
follow given by Twitter when creating a new 
account. Other possible predictors included in this 
step are the profile image and banner as well as the 
age of the account. As a second step, the tweets and 
retweets were checked when available to see what 
kind of activity the account has and what other 
accounts it interacts with. As the third step, the 
accounts that the possible bot was following were 
inspected to find discrepancies. For example, a user 
following mainly seemingly random foreign accounts 
coupled with one Finnish politician or if it was 
following exactly 21 very popular Finnish accounts 
were usually the best predictors of an accurate 
classification as a bot even though the machine 
learning model did not look for these. If after the 
three first steps the account was still too ambiguous 
for classification, the likes and followers were 
checked for bot-like behavior.  
During this process, several interesting findings 
were made, which can be used later in the analysis of 
the whole dataset. Firstly, most of the bot accounts 
were dormant as well as possibly a part of a follower 
boosting operation. Secondly, most of the bots were 
difficult to label as political bots as it is not sure 
whether they were created to boost the followers of a 
particular politician or if it followed them by 
coincidence based on Twitter’s recommendations. 
Commonly, shared characteristics among bots 
included that they barely engaged with content or 
interacted with other users and that they followed a 
random group of 21 accounts, which most likely are 
those suggested by Twitter during the creation of the 
account [7, 8]. Peculiar accounts that they often 
followed included less well-known US politicians, an 
obscure game called Growtopia and a niche Finnish 
newspaper called Markkinointi and Mainonta. 
 
3.2. Building the bot prediction model  
 
The second version of the bot detection model 
differed from the previous one mainly in how the 
splitting of the training and validation data was done, 
what parameters and algorithms were used as well as 
how many features were included.  
New features could be added to the second 
version of the model as the training data was no 
longer a limiting factor. By including the age of the 
account, and two ratio features derived from 
comparing the profile information to the age of the 
account, the number of features was increased from 
11 to 14.  
Several variants of the Random Forest algorithm 
were tested, but the standard version still performed 
optimally and was selected for the final model. The 
model was trained with a randomly sampled set of 
500 bots and 500 humans from the new manually 
labeled dataset. The remaining 1000, with 836 bots 
and 164 humans, were used in the validation of the 
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performance. The final version of the bot detection 
model has an accuracy of 83% with only slight 
changes after multiple runs and small variations in 
parameter settings. Table 3 lists the most important 
statistics for assessing the performance. 
 
Table 3: Performance of the bot detection model 
Metric Value 
Accuracy  
Recall 
Specificity 
0.837 
0.846 
0.793 
 
 
Table 4: Features ranked 
Rank Feature Importance 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Following 
Following to age of account 
Age of account 
Followers to following 
Likes to following 
Tweets 
Likes to age of account 
Followers 
Default profile image 
Likes 
No description 
No location 
No banner 
Likes to followers 
100.00 
61.00 
56.57 
22.87 
15.68 
15.18 
11.95 
10.05 
7.11 
6.34 
4.72 
3.61 
2.56 
0.00 
 
In terms of feature importance, the top features 
were a mix of profile information and ratio features, 
while the binary features were all in the bottom half 
of the feature ranking. Table 4 contains the full 
ranking of the features. Based on this, the model 
gives much weight to the number of accounts that an 
account is following, since the two top features are 
related to the following attribute. This is somewhat 
problematic for our overall goal of political bot 
detection as it implies that the model is best at 
detecting dormant bots and bots belonging to 
follower farms. These accounts can be political bots, 
but in many cases determining if they are following 
politicians on purpose or by coincidence is difficult. 
This is because the popular politicians often appear 
on the top of the recommended accounts to follow in 
Finland.  
 
4. Findings and discussion 
 
4.1. The proposed bot detection model 
 
The bot detection model proposed in this study 
demonstrated that metadata alone is sufficient for 
classifying at least spambots and bots that belong to 
follower farms. The primary benefit of a model based 
on metadata is that the data collection is much 
quicker as 90,000 accounts’ information can be 
retrieved every 15 minutes. Therefore, a model that 
uses metadata works particularly well when studying 
countries that have a small population, since then 
even the most popular Twitter users are likely to have 
a manageable number of followers. In other words, 
due to the limited number of users in these countries, 
it is possible to gather comprehensive datasets for 
analysis in short periods. Furthermore, analyzing 
entire populations instead of samples is feasible with 
a purely metadata-based model, contrary to models 
that use tweet data, where the number of accounts to 
analyze is restricted by Twitter’s streaming API’s 
rate limits. 
Regarding the selection of the feature space and 
algorithm, most of the results were in line with the 
reviewed literature, although some of the results were 
surprising. Random forest was the optimal 
classification algorithm, which was the result in 
several other models as well [18]. While ratio 
features had high feature importance as suggested by 
previous research, the binary features did not despite 
their popularity in earlier models. Overall, the 
performance of the model was below most of those 
listed in the literature review, but as stated earlier 
direct comparison is difficult due to the differences in 
the goals of the models.  
 
4.2. Bots Counts in Finnish political Twitter 
 
Based on our bot detection model, we predicted the 
total number of bots in the dataset consisting of the 
558,983 followers of the 14 Finnish politicians was 
formatted to match the training dataset. The model 
predicted that out of the dataset approximately 36.6% 
are bots. Since the model’s accuracy is 83%, out of 
the 204,426 accounts classified as bots it can be 
assumed that 169,673 should be the real number of 
bots when not taking into consideration the accounts 
labeled as humans that in reality, are bots. Therefore, 
the percentage of bots in reality is likely to be closer 
to 30% based on the results and the accuracy of the 
model. 
 
 
4.3. Influence of Bots in Finnish political 
Twitter 
 
Overall, the findings of the study do not support 
the notion that Finland and Finnish politics would be 
the target of internal or external bot influencing 
campaign, due to most of the bots having almost no 
activity besides following popular accounts. This 
finding is line with a recent announcement made by 
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Supo, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, 
which stated that it has not found evidence of foreign 
entities attempting to influence the elections [26].  
Despite few political bots, over 150,000 bot 
accounts following Finnish politicians on Twitter 
were identified. Although these bot accounts do not 
interact much with other accounts, they still help the 
politicians that they follow by two ways. Firstly, they 
artificially inflate the number of followers a politician 
has making them possibly more popular than they 
actually are. Secondly, they help increase the 
visibility of politicians, since being followed by 
many promotes an account over other less popular 
accounts in Twitter’s “who to follow” suggestions. 
Consequently, bot accounts that were created for an 
entirely different purpose may unintentionally follow 
politicians when they follow their accounts based on 
Twitter’s recommendations.  
The primary impact that the bots have on Finnish 
political Twitter is related to increase the visibility 
and perceived popularity of the politicians’ accounts. 
Considering a low utilization of Twitter as a medium 
for political debate in Finland, the possible effects the 
bots that may have had on voters may be negligible. 
Nevertheless, one metric for measuring a politician’s 
popularity that can be used to predict election results 
is how many followers they have on different 
platforms and how much their audience engages with 
them [27]. Therefore, even if the impact on actual 
voting behavior is minimal, the presence of bots may 
manipulate perceptions, influence predictions and 
damage the validity of social media engagement as 
an indicator of actual popularity. 
When inspecting the scores of individual 
politicians, Pekka Haavisto and Alexander Stubb had 
the highest percentages of bot followers, with both at 
above 30%, which is beyond Twitter’s own estimates 
of 5-10% accounts being bots. The strong bot 
presence in Haavisto’s Twitter follower base was 
subject to debate already in 2017 during his 
presidential election campaign [28]. Previous 
analysis attributed the bot followers to a result of a 
sudden increase in bots promoting the game 
Growtopia and Twitter’s recommendations boosting 
Haavisto, which is similar to the findings of this 
study. 
Alexander Stubb, the other notable example of a 
politician benefitting from the added visibility, has 
acquired the largest absolute number of bot 
followers. Many of the bots did not follow any other 
politicians besides Stubb, which is likely due to his 
strong presence in Twitter as the 3rd most followed 
account in Finland.  
Contrary to findings elsewhere [4, 9], the 
candidates most likely to be linked to the Finnish alt-
right movement Laura Huhtasaari and Jussi Halla-
aho had the lowest percentage of bot followers. 
However, this is not surprising when taking into 
consideration that they also have the lowest number 
of followers from the sample of accounts inspected, 
which means that they do not attract bots that follow 
accounts by default based on Twitter’s 
recommendations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The goals of this study were to develop a new 
supervised machine learning bot detection model to 
investigate if Twitter bots were used to influence the 
2019 Finnish parliamentary election and to test a new 
approach for Twitter bot detection. The developed 
model was used to estimate the number of bot 
followers that a sample of the most popular Finnish 
politicians have in their follower base. 
The dataset used in the study consisted of 550,000 
unique accounts out of which roughly 169,600 were 
classified as bots. The metadata-based model was 
found to be feasible for classifying bots on Twitter 
and the predictions of the model were used to assess 
if bots were utilized during the 2019 Finnish 
parliamentary election. The findings imply no 
evidence of attempts to influence the elections via 
Twitter bots. Although the bots increased the 
visibility of some politicians and made them seem 
more popular, the bots are unlikely to have had much 
effect due to their passive behavior.  
This study holds important implications for both 
the researchers as well as practitioners. Our study 
explores a number of primary meta data-based 
features as well as ratio-based profile features to 
predict bots in Twitter. This approach provides better 
coverage of the profile characteristics, and it is 
generalizable to a wide variety of context due to the 
linguistics independence.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the 
first in studying the presence and influence of bots in 
a Finnish context. Our results imply that the bots are 
surfacing in the Finnish domain. Even though we did 
not find the bots to have a significant impact, we 
cannot predict how this could change in the future. 
These results should be of interest not only to 
researchers, but also to politicians and users of social 
media in Finland. 
Lastly, our results also highlight the influence that 
Twitter’s suggestions can have on the number of 
followers that popular accounts have. These results 
indicate that profiles followed by bots are likely to 
attract more bots, further inflating their number of 
followers and perceived popularity.  
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5.1. Limitations 
 
Like all studies, our study also has limitations. 
First, the approach used in the selection of politicians 
and data collection phase as well as the choice of 
features in the machine learning model introduced 
some constraints to the analyses that could be 
performed. Our sampling approach ignores the user 
accounts that do not follow politician yet remain 
politically active. Although it was possible to 
determine if an account is a bot based on metadata, 
the collected data did not enable examining the 
content that they interacted with or spread via tweets, 
retweets, and likes. However, it is worth noting that 
most of the bots detected are not actively creating or 
distributing content. Lastly, politicians with much 
higher or lower percentages of bot followers may 
have been omitted from the sample.  
 
5.2. Suggestions for further research 
 
To further understand the use of bots in the 
Twittersphere, the model could be reused during 
future elections by collecting new datasets. This 
would be particularly interesting due to the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service’s suggestion that the 
EU elections are likely to be a more attractive target 
for external influencing attempts than the Finnish 
parliamentary election [26]. 
To analyze the efficiency of Twitter’s own bot 
detection and removal practices, the rate at which 
accounts labeled as bots are removed from the social 
media site can be followed. In addition, changes in 
the activity of the bots can be monitored by 
inspecting how the attributes such as a number of 
tweets and likes changes over time. Especially 
interesting would be to find evidence if some of the 
accounts were sleeper bots waiting for activation. 
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